

Message Text

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ACTION OES-06

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R 031400Z JAN 77
FM AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9385
INFO AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES
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USMISSION IAEA VIENNA
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AMCONSUL RIO DE JANEIRO
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E.O. 11652: N/A
TAGS: TECH, ENRG, PARM, BR
SUBJECT: FUEL QUESTION ADDS TO NUCLEAR DEBATE IN BRAZIL URENCO

REF. BRASILIA 10513 (NOTAL)

1. SUMMARY. THE ALLEGED DUTCH DECISION TO REQUIRE GREATER
ASSURANCES FROM BRAZIL OF PEACEFUL USES OF NUCLEAR ENERGY
IS SERVING AS A VEHICLE FOR, AND A FOCAL POINT OF, A ADDITIONAL
NUCLEAR DEBATE IN BRAZIL. BRAZIL AWAITS ANXIOUSLY THE RESULT
OF FURTHER DUTCH CONSULTATIONS WITH ITS URENCO PARTNERS.

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THE GOB MAINTAINS AN OFFICIAL NO COMMENT POSTURE, BUT
OFFICIALLY-INSPIRED BACKGROUNDERS REVEAL CONCERNED, SOMEWHAT
CONFUSED, BUT OUTWARDLY CONFIDENT OPINIONS WITHIN
OFFICIAL CIRCLES. THESE CIRCLES SEEM PARTICULARLY CONFIDENT
THAT WEST GERMANY WILL MAKE EVERY POSSIBLE EFFORT
TO OBTAIN THE FUEL FOR ANGRA II AND III, AND TO DEFEND
THE FRG-GOB AGREEMENT. BUT SOME SOURCES EXPRESS DOUBTS

ABOUT WEST GERMANY'S ABILITY TO WITHSTAND INTERNATIONAL PRESSURES. THE PRESS FORESEES DIFFICULT NUCLEAR POLICY DECISIONS AHEAD FOR THE GEISEL ADMINISTRATION. ONE OF BRAZIL'S MOST PRESTIGIOUS NEWSPAPERS JUDGES THAT THE DUTCH DECISION HAS COMPROMISED THE BASIC PURPOSES OF THE FRG-FOB AGREEMENT, INCLUDING THE UNSPOKEN BUT NONETHE- LESS REAL PURPOSE OF ACQUIRING A NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVES CA- PABILITY. PRESS SUSPICION OF SUPERPOWER MANEUVERING IS SLIGHTLY LESS REGARDING THE DUTCH DECISION THAN IT HAS BEEN WITH RESPECT TO INTERNATIONAL CRITICISM OF THE FRG-GOB AGREEMENT. END SUMMARY.

2. PRESS REPORTS HERE SAY DUTCH FONMIN VAN DER STOEL HAS SCHEDULED CONSULTATIONS IN LONDON AND BONN. AFTER- WARDS HE WILL "EXPLAIN" TO THE DUTCH PARLIAMENT THE GON'S DECISION. THE LATEST REPORTS FROM THE HAGUE, CARRIED IN THE DEC. 24 EDITION OF RIO DE JANEIRO'S JORNAL DO BRASIL, STATE THAT: -- ACCORDING TO A DUTCH FONMIN SPOKESMAN, THE NETHERLANDS HAS NOT VETOED ENRICHED URANIUM FOR BRAZIL; IT ONLY WANTS GUARANTEES FOR PEACEFUL USES.

-- ACCORDING TO VAN DER STOEL, THE URENCO DECISION WILL BE TAKEN BY UNANIMOUS VOTE.

THERE IS SOME UNCERTAINTY IN PRESS REPORTS ABOUT THE RELATIONSHIP, IF ANY, BETWEEN DECISIONS ON URENCO EXPANSION, AND THE DECISION WHETHER TO SUPPLY FUEL TO BRAZIL OR OTHER NON-NPT ADHERENTS.
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3. OFFICIAL POSUTURE. THE GOB MAINTAINS A GENERAL NO COMMENT POSTURE ON NUCLEAR QUESTIONS IN ORDER NOT "TO FUEL POLEMICS". MINES AND ENERGY MINISTER UEKI, ON DEC. 26, DEPARTED FROM THE POLICY TO SAY THAT GOB HAS RECEIVED OFFICIALLY NO "PRESSURES AND THREATS" FROM NUCLEAR COUNTRIES. HE REITERATED THAT BRAZIL WILL PAY WHATEVER IT COSTS TO PRODUCE ITS OWN REACTORS AND TO OBTAIN FULL FUEL CYCLE TECHNOLOGY.

4. UNIDENTIFIED BUT APPARENTLY OFFICIAL SOURCES, HOWEVER, PROBABLY INCLUDING NUCLEBRAS IN RIO DE JANEIRO, CONTINUE TO SPEAK FREQUENTLY AND CANDIDLY WITH THE PRESS. "HIGH NUCLEAR SECTOR SOURCES" IN RIO DE JANEIRO QUOTED IN THE DEC. 28 EDITION OF GAZETA MERCANTIL, BRAZIL'S MAJOR BUSINESS AND FINANCIAL DAILY, PROFESSED TO BE "NOT PARTICULARLY APPRE- HENSIVE" ABOUT THE DUTCH DECISION SINCE ANY OF URENCO'S MEMBER-COUNTRIES COULD FULFILL THE URENCO-NUCLEBRAS

ARRANGEMENT. CONTRARY TO THE IMPLICATIONS OF VAN DER STOEL'S POINT ABOUT UNANIMITY, THE SOURCES SAID GERMANY WOULD NEED ONLY "TACIT CONSENT" FROM THE U.K. AND THE NETHERLANDS IN ORDER TO SUPPLY BRAZIL.

5. THE SOURCES PREDICTED, ACCORDING TO "GAZETA", THAT THE USSR WOULD ALWAYS BE WILLING TO SUPPLY BRAZIL. OTHER UNIDENTIFIED SOURCES QUESTION THIS. FONMIN SOURCES CITED IN A DEC. 27 GAZETA STORY EXPRESSED THE VIEW THAT THE USSR AND THE US ARE OPPOSED "TO THE DISSEMINATION OF NUCLEAR POWER IN THE WORLD". THE FONMIN SOURCES ALSO NOTED THE FRENCH CESSION TO "INTERNATIONAL PRESSURES, LEADING TO THE ABANDONMENT OF CONTRACTS WITH PAKISTAN (SIC) AND IRAQ".

6. THE FOREIGN MINISTRY SOURCES PROFESS TO BE CONFIDENT, PERHAPS EVEN SMUGLY SO, THAT THE FRG WILL COME LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

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THROUGH FOR BRAZIL. "THE DUTCH THREATS ARE BONN'S PROBLEM," ACCORDING TO UNIDENTIFIED FONMIN OFFICIALS CITED IN THE SAME DEC. 27 GAZETA ARTICLE. "THIS ATTITUDE FITS PERFECTLY IN THE BRAZILIAN FOREIGN MINISTER'S STRATEGY OF LEAVING IN THE HANDS OF THE MORE POWERFUL PARTNER THE NEGOTIATIONS WITH THIRD COUNTRIES, A STRATEGY INAUGURATED AFTER CARTER'S FIRST OBJECTIONS TO THE AGREEMENT," GAZETA OBSERVED.

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THE ARTICLE ALSO SAID PRESIDENT GEISEL HIMSELF WAS MAKING NUCLEAR STRATEGY DECISIONS, WITH ADVICE FROM THE MINISTER OF MINES AND ENERGY AND THE MINISTER OF PLANNING, AS WELL AS FROM "MILITARY CIRCLES". (COMMENT. THE FOREIGN MINISTRY SHOULD BE INCLUDED IN THIS LIST.)

7. ANOTHER DEC. 27 GAZETA STORY QUOTED A "HIGH DIPLOMATIC SOURCE IN BRAZILIA" AS SAYING THAT:
--"BRAZIL NEVER WILL CEDE TO DUTCH PRESSURES TO SIGN THE NPT, EVEN IF THIS CAUSES AN IMPASSE CAPABLE OF DELAYING THE BRAZILIAN NUCLEAR PROGRAM."
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"" "BRAZILIAN NUCLEAR DEVELOPMENT IS CONSIDERED TO BE A QUESTION OF NATIONAL SECURITY AN ASPECT WHICH ALLOWS NO FLEXIBILITY."

A DEC. 24 "O GLOBO" STORY QUOTED UNNAMED "DOPLOMATIC SOURCES" IN BRASILIA AS SAYING THAT THE DUTCH POSITION (OF SEEKING MORE ASSURANCES FOR PEACEFUL USES) IS A "DEMAGOGIC ATTITUDE DESIGNED FOR INTERNAL EFFECT".

8. ON DEC. 29, JORNAL DO BRASIL QUOTED AN UNNAMED FONMIN SPOKESMAN AS REITERATING THE GOB'S CONFIDENCE IN THE EXECUTION OF THE FRG-GOB AGREEMENT -- "THE PRINCIPAL GUARANTEE OF THIS BEING THE WORD OF THE BONN GOVERNMENT." (COMMENT. IT IS UNCLEAR WHETHER THIS STATEMENT IMPLIES A RECENT GERMAN REITERATION TO THE GOB OF THE FRG'S COMMITMENT TO FULFILL THE AGREEMENT.) THE SPOKESMAN REPORTEDLY SAID AMBASSADOR PINHEIRO IN WASHINGTON WAS CAREFULLY WATCHING USG INITIATIVES REGARDING NUCLEAR SUBJECTS WITH AN EYE TOWARD THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FRG-GOB AGREEMENT. THE SPOKESMAN COMMENTED, THE STORY SAID, THAT THE FORD ADMINISTRATION HAD AVOIDED "ANY DIRECT

ATTACK ON THE AGREEMENT, THUS MAINTAINING INTACT THE CLIMATE OF CORDIALITY THAT SECRETARY KISSINGER ESTABLISHED WITH THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT AND, IN PARTICULAR, WITH THE BRAZILIAN GOVERNMENT DURING HIS FEBRUARY VISIT TO BRASILIA." FONMIN "SOURCES", ACCORDING TO THE STORY, DENIED "THE GOB WOULD USE THE THREAT OF DENOUNCING THE MILITARY COOPERATION AGREEMENT WITH THE U.S. AS AN INSTRUMENT OF PRESSURE TO NEUTRALIZE U.S. ATTACKS ON THE GERMAN AGREEMENT." A "HIGH OFFICIAL" OF THE FOREIGN MINISTRY SAID BRAZIL IS NOT PREPARED TO ENTER INTO A "CONTEST OF FORCE" WITH THE U.S. OVER AN AGREEMENT WITH THE FRG BECAUSE IN THE MINISTRY'S VIEW THE AGREEMENT IS OF NO CONCERN TO THIRD COUNTRIES.

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9. PRESS COMMENTARY. PRESS COMMENTARY AGREES THAT PRESIDENT GEISEL FACES VERY DIFFICULT DECISIONS ON NUCLEAR POLICY IN 1977, AND ONE COLUMNIST SAID THE SAME APPLIED TO WEST GERMANY(S) SCHMIDT. BRAZIL'S DECISIONS MUST ENCOMPASS NOT ONLY FUEL SUPPLY BUT ALSO THE COUNTRY'S OVERALL NUCLEAR STRATEGY, THE PRESS COMMENTS. THE LEAD EDITORIAL IN THE DEC. 24 EDITION OF THE JORNAL DO BRASIL ARGUED THAT THE GOVERNMENT SHOULD MAKE MORE FACTS AVAILABLE SO THAT THE PUBLIC COULD PARTICIPATE IN THE DEBATE LEADING TO DECISIONS. NUCLEBRAS WAS NOT THE REPOSITORY OF NATIONAL INTERESTS AND ASPIRATIONS. THE PUBLIC COULD HELP THE GOVERNMENT IF THE PEOPLE WERE EDUCATED TO DEFEND THEIR INTERESTS. AS FOR THE JORNAL'S SUBSTANTIVE RECOMMENDATION, IT WENT NO FURTHER THAN TO SAY THAT BRAZIL MUST "DEMARCATÉ WITH CLARITY THE FRONTIERS OF ITS SOVEREIGNTY".

10. THE LEAD EDITORIAL IN THE DEC. 23 EDITION OF THE PRESTIGIOUS "O ESTADO DE SAO PAULO" WAS BRUTALLY CANDID ABOUT BRAZIL'S NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE AIMS, AND NOT PARTICULARLY OPTIMISTIC THAT THE GERMANS COULD HONOR ALL PARTS OF THE FRG-GOB AGREEMENT IN THE FACE OF DUTCH OPPOSITION TO URENCO FUEL. O ESTADO BELIEVED THE DUTCH DECISION "COMPROMISES ALL THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE NUCLEAR AGREEMENT WITH GERMANY". THE AGREEMENT HAS SEVERAL BASIC PURPOSES:

-- TO GUARANTEE THE SUPPLY OF ELECTRICAL ENERGY FROM REACTORS,
-- TO ASSURE THE TRANSFER OF THE FULL FUEL CYCLE, AND,
-- "AS A CONSEQUENCE, TO PERMIT BRAZIL TO HAVE CONDITIONS TO FABRICATE NUCLEAR DEVICES, PROVIDED THAT THERE EXIST THE INDISPENSABLE ECONOMIC CONDITIONS AND THE NECESSARY POLITICAL WILL.

11. THE EDITORIAL WENT ON TO SAY: "THIS LAST PREMISE NEVER WAS AFFIRMED AS GOVERNMENT POLICY ALTHOUGH IT WAS

EASILY DEDUCIBLE FROM TWO INTERNATIONAL ACTS BY THE
COSTA E SILVA GOVERNMENT: THE FORMAL REFUSAL TO SIGN
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THE NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY (NPT), AND BRAZIL'S
SIGNATURE AND RATIFICATION OF THE TREATY FOR THE DE-
NUCLEARIZATION OF LATIN AMERICA (SIC)." THE LATTER
TREATY, EVEN IF IT IMPEDES THE CONTRACTING PARTIES
FROM STORING NUCLEAR ARMS IN ITS TERRITORY, STILL
AUTHORIZES BRAZIL EXPRESSLY, BY ARTICLE 18, "TO DETO-
NATE NUCLEAR DEVICES (A TERM CONSECRATED IN THE TREATY)
FOR PEACEFUL PURPOSES". SINCE THE TLATELOLCO TREATY
"DID NOT SPECIFY THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN ARMS AND
DEVICES, IT CAN BE INFERRED THAT A LATIN AMERICAN
COUNTRY POSSESSING A DEVICE THEORETICALLY DESTINED
FOR PEACEFUL USE COULD DETONATE IT FOR MILITARY ENDS IF
AND WHEN THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION" LED THE COUNTRY

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TO SUCH ACTION. "THIS IS THE CURRENT INTERPRETATION IN ALL THE CIRCLES CONCERNED WITH THE PROBLEM," AND IT DOUBTLESSLY "INSPIRED, IN THE SPECIAL CASE OF BRAZIL, THE FEARS OF CARTER AND THE OPPOSITION OF HOLLAND".

12. IF THIS INTERPRETATION IS CORRECT, THE EDITORIAL OBSERVED, THEN BRAZIL EITHER WILL HAVE TO REFUSE TO SIGN THE NPT AND THUS ACCEPT THE "FREEZING OF INTERNATIONAL POWER RELATIONS," OR ELSE ADHERE TO THE NPT AND FOREGO THE EXPECTED EFFECTS OF THE TLA TELLO CO TREATY. THE LATTER ALTERNATIVE IMPLIES THAT BRAZIL "AGREE TO RENOUNCE THE LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

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FABRICATION OF NUCLEAR DEVICES FOR PEACEFUL ENDS, AND THUS TO LIMIT ITS NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGICAL PROGRESS". WITH A CLARITY NOT USUAL IN BRAZILIAN COMMENTARY, THE EDITORIAL THEN COMMENTED: "THIS IS THE PROBLEM THAT IS POSED -- AND ONLY THIS. WITH REGARD TO THE SUPPLY OF ENERGY PURE AND SIMPLE, THE DUTCH POSITION IN NO WAY WILL AFFECT US IF WE ACCEPT THE HAGUE'S CONDITIONS."

13. GERMANY'S ROLE. THE PRESS GENERALLY SHARES THE CONFIDENCE OF FONMIN SOURCES IN GERMANY'S COMMITMENT TO MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO OBTAIN FUEL FOR ANGRA II AND III, AND TO FULFILL THE FRG-GOB AGREEMENT, BUT THE PRESS IS MORE SCEPTICAL OF WEST GERMANY'S ABILITY TO WITHSTAND INTERNATIONAL PRESSURES. THE INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS COLUMNIST FOR BRASILIA'S CORREIRO BRASILENSE, BENEDITO COUTINHO, REFLECTED THIS AMBIVALENCE IN A DEC. 24 COLUMN. AFTER RECOUNTING GERMANY'S SURREPTITIOUS WAR-TIME NUCLEAR DEVELOPMENT EFFORTS, COUTINHO CONCLUDED THAT AMERICA'S AND RUSSIA'S GREATEST SUSPICIONS FALL ON BONN. (COMMENT: AS OPPOSED TO BRASILIA.) "IT IS DIFFICULT TO IMAGINE THAT WEST GERMANY, SURROUNDED ON ALL FOUR SIDES BY NUCLEAR POWERS, "CAN OPPOSE WHAT WASHINGTON SAYS. "TO KNOW UP TO WHAT POINT THE GERMANS WILL RESIST THE SIEGE IS DIFFICULT. BUT THEY ARE NOT ACCUSTOMED TO GIVING UP IN THE FIRST BATTLE."

14. SUPERPOWER ROLE IN RELATION TO PRE-DUTCH-CONTROVERSY PRESS COMMENTARY ON THE ROLE OF THE SUPERPOWERS IN MOBILIZING CRITICISM OF THE FRG-GOB AGREEMENT, THE PRESS COMMENTARY ON THE DUTCH QUESTION DEVOTES SLIGHTLY LESS ATTENTION TO SUPERPOWER MANEUVERING. THE PRESS SEEMS TO RECOGNIZE DUTCH POPULAR, PARTICULARLY LEFTIST, CONCERNS OVER URENCO EXPANSION AS WELL AS OVER SUPPLYING

FUEL TO NON-NPT ADHERENTS, SUCH AS BRAZIL. NONETHELESS,
THE O ESTADO EDITORIAL SAW THE DUTCH DECISION AS "ADHERENCE"
TO THE POLICIES OF PRESIDENT FORD AND PRESIDENT-ELECT
CARTER. AND CORREIO'S COUTINHO, PICKING UP ON THE
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HORIZONTAL VERSUS VERTICAL PROLIFERATION THEME, OPINED
THAT THE US AND THE USSR AGREE ON NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION
POLICY AND DISAGREE ONLY ON THE NUMBER OF WARHEADS IN THEIR
RESPECTIVE ARSENALS.
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